Existence of belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs

Tristan Tomala; J. Hörner; S. Lovo

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Existence of belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs

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1

Tristan Tomala

Function : Author

Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC

J. Hörner

Function : Author

S. Lovo

Function : Author

Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC

Keywords

Belief-free equilibria Games Known-own payoffs

Domains

Humanities and Social Sciences Economics and Finance Economy and decision science

Antoine Haldemann : Connect in order to contact the contributor

https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00495690

Submitted on : Monday, June 28, 2010-3:27:30 PM

Last modification on : Saturday, June 25, 2022-10:50:59 AM

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hal-00495690 , version 1 (28-06-2010)

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HAL Id : hal-00495690 , version 1

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Tristan Tomala, J. Hörner, S. Lovo. Existence of belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs. Conférence Théorie des jeux et applications, May 2009, Marseille, France. ⟨hal-00495690⟩

Existence of belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs

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