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Conference papers

Existence of belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs

Tristan Tomala 1 J. Hörner S. Lovo 1
1 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC
Keywords : Belief-free equilibria Games Known-own payoffs
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Conference papers
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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00495690
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Monday, June 28, 2010 - 3:27:30 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM

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Tristan Tomala, J. Hörner, S. Lovo. Existence of belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs. Conférence Théorie des jeux et applications, May 2009, Marseille, France. ⟨hal-00495690⟩

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