Protocols with no acknowledgment

Dinah Rosenberg (1) , Eilon Solan (2) , Nicolas Vieille (3)

1 LAGA - Laboratoire Analyse, Géométrie et Applications
2 TAU - Tel Aviv University
3 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC

We study a simple protocol for communication networks, in which users get no receipt acknowledgment of their requests. As a result, users hold partial and differential information over the state of the protocol. We characterize optimal behavior by viewing the protocol as a stochastic game with partial observation. We also study two classes of protocols that generalize this protocol.

Mots clés: games/group decisions; stochastic

Domaines: Economie et sciences de la décision

Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille. Protocols with no acknowledgment. Operations Research, 2009, Vol.57,nº4, pp.905-915. ⟨10.1287/opre.1080.0644⟩. ⟨hal-00491697⟩