Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Reports Year : 2008

Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence

(1) , (1) ,
1
Johannes Hörner
  • Function : Author
  • PersonId : 837035

Abstract

We characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information with N \ge 2 players and arbitrary information structures. This characterization involves a new type of individual rational constraint linking the lowest equilibrium payoffs across players. The characterization is tight: we define a set of payoffs that contains all the belief-free equilibrium payoffs; conversely, any point in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff vector when players are sufficiently patient. Further, we provide necessary conditions and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty, both for the case of known-own payoffs, and for arbitrary payoffs.
Not file

Dates and versions

hal-00489877 , version 1 (07-06-2010)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-00489877 , version 1

Cite

Stefano Lovo, Tristan Tomala, Johannes Hörner. Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence. 2008. ⟨hal-00489877⟩

Collections

HEC CNRS LARA
100 View
0 Download

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More