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The Maxmin of Recursive Games with Incomplete Information on one Side

Nicolas Vieille 1, 2 Dinah Rosenberg 3 
1 CECO - Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique
2 GREThA - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée
3 LAGA - Laboratoire Analyse, Géométrie et Applications
Abstract : We prove the existence of the maxmin of zero-sum recursive games with one sided information.
Keywords : Stochastic games recursive games incomplete information maxmin value
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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00481429
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, May 6, 2010 - 4:10:42 PM
Last modification on : Saturday, June 25, 2022 - 10:50:47 AM

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Nicolas Vieille, Dinah Rosenberg. The Maxmin of Recursive Games with Incomplete Information on one Side. Mathematics of Operations Research, 2000, Vol.25,n°1, pp.23-35. ⟨10.1287/moor.25.1.23.15206⟩. ⟨hal-00481429⟩

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