Two-player stochastic games II: The case of recursive games

Nicolas Vieille (1, 2)

1 CECO - Laboratoire d'économétrie de l'École polytechnique
2 GREThA - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée

This paper contains the second step in the proof of existence of equilibrium payoffs for two-player stochastic games. It deals with the case of positive absorbing recursive games

Mots clés: stochastic games

Domaines: Economie et sciences de la décision

Nicolas Vieille. Two-player stochastic games II: The case of recursive games. Israel Journal of Mathematics, 2000, Vol.119,n°1, pp.93-126. ⟨10.1007/BF02810664⟩. ⟨hal-00481416⟩