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Bargaining over an uncertain outcome: the role of beliefs

Abstract : We study the Nash bargaining solution of a problem in which two agents bargain over an uncertain outcome. Under the assumptions of risk neutrality and of constant absolute risk aversion, we study the way that the solution varies, ex ante, when we vary the beliefs of one agent. Changing an agent's beliefs in a way that makes them "more distant" from the other agent's beliefs makes the second agent better off.
Keywords : risk games outcome
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Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, May 6, 2010 - 1:48:55 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, January 26, 2022 - 3:10:18 PM

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Antoine Billot, Alain Chateauneuf, Itzhak Gilboa, Jean-Marc Tallon. Bargaining over an uncertain outcome: the role of beliefs. Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer-Verlag, 2002, Vol.25, n°1, pp.33-45. ⟨10.1007/s102030200002⟩. ⟨hal-00481313⟩



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