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Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes

Abstract : Several authors have indicated a contradiction between consistent aggregation of subjective beliefs and tastes, and a Pareto condition. We argue that the Pareto condition that implies the contradiction is not compelling. Society should not necessarily endorse a unanimous choice when it is based on contradictory beliefs. Restricting the Pareto condition to choices that only involve identical beliefs allows a utilitarian aggregation: both society's utility function and its probability measure are linear combinations of those of the individuals.
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Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, May 6, 2010 - 11:55:36 AM
Last modification on : Saturday, June 25, 2022 - 10:50:46 AM





Itzhak Gilboa, D. Samet, D. Schmeidler. Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes. Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, 2004, vol. 112, pp.932-938. ⟨10.1086/421173⟩. ⟨hal-00481249⟩



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