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Journal Articles Journal of Political Economy Year : 2004

Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes

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1
D. Samet
  • Function : Author
D. Schmeidler
  • Function : Author

Abstract

Several authors have indicated a contradiction between consistent aggregation of subjective beliefs and tastes, and a Pareto condition. We argue that the Pareto condition that implies the contradiction is not compelling. Society should not necessarily endorse a unanimous choice when it is based on contradictory beliefs. Restricting the Pareto condition to choices that only involve identical beliefs allows a utilitarian aggregation: both society's utility function and its probability measure are linear combinations of those of the individuals.
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Dates and versions

hal-00481249 , version 1 (06-05-2010)

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Itzhak Gilboa, D. Samet, D. Schmeidler. Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes. Journal of Political Economy, 2004, vol. 112, pp.932-938. ⟨10.1086/421173⟩. ⟨hal-00481249⟩

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