Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes

Itzhak Gilboa (1) , D. Samet , D. Schmeidler

1 TAU - Tel Aviv University

Several authors have indicated a contradiction between consistent aggregation of subjective beliefs and tastes, and a Pareto condition. We argue that the Pareto condition that implies the contradiction is not compelling. Society should not necessarily endorse a unanimous choice when it is based on contradictory beliefs. Restricting the Pareto condition to choices that only involve identical beliefs allows a utilitarian aggregation: both society's utility function and its probability measure are linear combinations of those of the individuals.

Mots clés: Utilitarianism; Pareto

Domaines: Economie et sciences de la décision

Itzhak Gilboa, D. Samet, D. Schmeidler. Utilitarian Aggregation of Beliefs and Tastes. Journal of Political Economy, 2004, vol. 112, pp.932-938. ⟨10.1086/421173⟩. ⟨hal-00481249⟩