Floors, dealer markets and limit order markets - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Journal Articles Journal of Financial Markets Year : 1998

Floors, dealer markets and limit order markets

(1) , ,
1
Thierry Foucault
  • Function : Author
  • PersonId : 830726
Bruno Biais
  • Function : Author
Francois Salanie

Abstract

In dealer markets, liquidity suppliers have entire flexibility to bargain on the price with their customers. In limit order markets, they are restricted to convex schedules: they cannot sell the first share at a higher price than the second. Floor traders simply respond to the liquidity demand conveyed by brokers by crying out one price. In floor markets risk-sharing is inefficient and spreads are large. In dealer markets, risk-sharing can be efficient, but spreads tend to be large. In limit order markets, the unique equilibrium entails efficient risk-sharing and competitive spreads. Hence there is a non-monotonic relation between the efficiency of the market and the extent to which the offers of the liquidity suppliers are restricted.

Dates and versions

hal-00481194 , version 1 (06-05-2010)

Identifiers

Cite

Thierry Foucault, Bruno Biais, Francois Salanie. Floors, dealer markets and limit order markets. Journal of Financial Markets, 1998, Vol.1, n°3-4, pp. 253-284. ⟨10.1016/S1386-4181(98)00003-2⟩. ⟨hal-00481194⟩

Collections

HEC
69 View
0 Download

Altmetric

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More