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Ownership, organization, and private firms' efficient use of resources

Abstract : The principal-agent theory asserts that public firms' performance is driven by efficient capital and labor markets but is silent about non-listed private companies, which are less permeable to market forces (both capital and labor) than are public companies. We propose and test a 2 x 2 framework distinguishing owner-controlled vs. agent-led firms from firms with a flat vs. multilayer organization. Our findings provide highly contrasted results and raise important issues for further study of private firms.
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Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Wednesday, May 5, 2010 - 10:27:56 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, March 31, 2022 - 5:58:01 PM


  • HAL Id : hal-00480849, version 1



Rodolphe Durand, Vicente Vargas. Ownership, organization, and private firms' efficient use of resources. Strategic Management Journal, Wiley, 2003, Vol.24, n°7, pp. 667-675. ⟨hal-00480849⟩



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