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Journal Articles Strategic Management Journal Year : 2003

Ownership, organization, and private firms' efficient use of resources

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Rodolphe Durand
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  • PersonId : 837189

Abstract

The principal-agent theory asserts that public firms' performance is driven by efficient capital and labor markets but is silent about non-listed private companies, which are less permeable to market forces (both capital and labor) than are public companies. We propose and test a 2 x 2 framework distinguishing owner-controlled vs. agent-led firms from firms with a flat vs. multilayer organization. Our findings provide highly contrasted results and raise important issues for further study of private firms.
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Dates and versions

hal-00480849 , version 1 (05-05-2010)

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  • HAL Id : hal-00480849 , version 1

Cite

Rodolphe Durand, Vicente Vargas. Ownership, organization, and private firms' efficient use of resources. Strategic Management Journal, 2003, Vol.24, n°7, pp. 667-675. ⟨hal-00480849⟩

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