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Journal Articles SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization Year : 2000

Solvable States in n-player Stochastic Games

Abstract

We prove that, in every stochastic game with finitely many states and actions, there exists at least one state, starting from which an equilibrium payoff exists. This is achieved by proving that there exists a solvable set. This generalizes to an arbitrary number of players a result due to Thuijsman and Vrieze in the case of two players.
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Dates and versions

hal-00465045 , version 1 (18-03-2010)

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Nicolas Vieille. Solvable States in n-player Stochastic Games. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 2000, Vol.38,n°6, pp.1794-1804. ⟨10.1137/S0363012998345937⟩. ⟨hal-00465045⟩

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