Repeated communication through the mechanism and

Nicolas Vieille (1) , Olivier Gossner

1 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC

We consider the “and” communication device that receives inputs from two players and outputs the public signal yes if both messages are yes, and outputs no otherwise. We prove that no correlation can securely be implemented using this device, even when infinitely many stages of communication are allowed.

Keywords: Repeated communication; Mechanism And

Domains: Humanities and Social Sciences; Economics and Finance; Economy and decision science

Nicolas Vieille, Olivier Gossner. Repeated communication through the mechanism and. International Journal of Game Theory, 2001, Vol.30,n°1, pp.41-60. ⟨10.1007/s001820100063⟩. ⟨hal-00465040⟩