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Strategic learning in games with symmetric information

Abstract : This article studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponents'. We chararacterize equilibrium payoffs in terms of simple strategies in which an exploration phase is followed by a payoff acquisition phase.
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Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, March 18, 2010 - 3:28:46 PM
Last modification on : Saturday, June 25, 2022 - 10:50:38 AM

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Nicolas Vieille, Olivier Gossner. Strategic learning in games with symmetric information. Games and Economic Behavior / Games and Economic Behaviour, 2003, Vol.42,n°1, pp.25-47. ⟨10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00535-3⟩. ⟨hal-00464978⟩



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