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Journal Articles Games and Economic Behavior / Games and Economic Behaviour Year : 2003

Strategic learning in games with symmetric information

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Abstract

This article studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponents'. We chararacterize equilibrium payoffs in terms of simple strategies in which an exploration phase is followed by a payoff acquisition phase.

Dates and versions

hal-00464978 , version 1 (18-03-2010)

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Nicolas Vieille, Olivier Gossner. Strategic learning in games with symmetric information. Games and Economic Behavior / Games and Economic Behaviour, 2003, Vol.42,n°1, pp.25-47. ⟨10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00535-3⟩. ⟨hal-00464978⟩
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