Strategic learning in games with symmetric information

Nicolas Vieille (1) , Olivier Gossner (2)

1 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC
2 THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications

This article studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponents'. We chararacterize equilibrium payoffs in terms of simple strategies in which an exploration phase is followed by a payoff acquisition phase.

Keywords: Public value of information; Games with incomplete information; Bandit problems

Domains: Economy and decision science

Nicolas Vieille, Olivier Gossner. Strategic learning in games with symmetric information. Games and Economic Behavior / Games and Economic Behaviour, 2003, Vol.42,n°1, pp.25-47. ⟨10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00535-3⟩. ⟨hal-00464978⟩