Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

Quitting games – An example

Abstract : Quitting games are multi-player sequential games in which, at every stage, each player has the choice between continuing and quitting. The game ends as soon as at least one player chooses to quit; each player i then receives a payoff r S i, which depends on the set S of players that did choose to quit. If the game never ends, the payoff to each player is zero.¶ We exhibit a four-player quitting game, where the “simplest” equilibrium is periodic with period two. We argue that this implies that all known methods to prove existence of an equilibrium payoff in multi-player stochastic games are therefore bound to fail in general, and provide some geometric intuition for this phenomenon.
Complete list of metadatas

https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00464962
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Thursday, March 18, 2010 - 3:03:38 PM
Last modification on : Wednesday, December 19, 2018 - 10:12:07 AM

Links full text

Identifiers

Collections

Citation

Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille. Quitting games – An example. International Journal of Game Theory, Springer Verlag, 2003, Vol.31,n°3, pp.365-381. ⟨10.1007/s001820200125⟩. ⟨hal-00464962⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

263