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Random Walks and Voting Theory

Abstract : Voters' preferences depend on available information. Following Case-Based Decision Theory, we assume that this information is processed additively. We prove that the collective preferences deduced from the individual ones through majority vote cannot be arbitrary, as soon as a winning quota is required. The proof is based on a new result on random walks.
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Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, March 18, 2010 - 2:20:19 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM




Nicolas Vieille. Random Walks and Voting Theory. Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, 2004, Vol.29,n°1, pp.106-113. ⟨10.1287/moor.1030.0052⟩. ⟨hal-00464928⟩



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