Continuous-time games of timing

Nicolas Vieille (1) , Eilon Solan (2) , Rida Laraki (3)

1 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC
2 TAU - Tel Aviv University
3 X-DEP-ECO - Département d'Économie de l'École Polytechnique

We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a Markov subgame perfect var epsilon-equilibrium, for each var epsilon>0. This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established.

Keywords: Timing games; Continuous-time games; Games of timing; War of attrition; Preemption games

Domains: Economy and decision science

Nicolas Vieille, Eilon Solan, Rida Laraki. Continuous-time games of timing. Journal of Economic Theory, 2005, Vol.120,n°2, pp.206-238. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.001⟩. ⟨hal-00464672⟩