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Continuous-time games of timing

Abstract : We address the question of existence of equilibrium in general timing games with complete information. Under weak assumptions, any two-player timing game has a Markov subgame perfect var epsilon-equilibrium, for each var epsilon>0. This result is tight. For some classes of games (symmetric games, games with cumulative payoffs), stronger existence results are established.
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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00464672
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Wednesday, March 17, 2010 - 4:50:49 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, November 21, 2019 - 3:32:04 PM

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Nicolas Vieille, Eilon Solan, Rida Laraki. Continuous-time games of timing. Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, 2005, Vol.120,n°2, pp.206-238. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2004.02.001⟩. ⟨hal-00464672⟩

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