Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons

Nicolas Vieille; Johannes Hörner

Journal articles

Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons

Nicolas Vieille ¹ Johannes Hörner ¹

1 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC

Abstract : We study the role of observability in bargaining with correlated values. Short-run buyers sequentially submit offers to one seller. When previous offers are observable, bargaining is likely to end up in an impasse. In contrast, when offers are hidden, agreement is always reached, although with delay.

Keywords : Public offer Private offer lemons market

Document type :

Journal articles

Domain :

Humanities and Social Sciences / Economics and Finance / Economy and decision science

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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00464577
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Wednesday, March 17, 2010 - 2:56:23 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM

Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons

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Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons

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