Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Journal Articles Econometrica Year : 2009

Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons

(1) , (1)
1

Abstract

We study the role of observability in bargaining with correlated values. Short-run buyers sequentially submit offers to one seller. When previous offers are observable, bargaining is likely to end up in an impasse. In contrast, when offers are hidden, agreement is always reached, although with delay.
Not file

Dates and versions

hal-00464577 , version 1 (17-03-2010)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-00464577 , version 1

Cite

Nicolas Vieille, Johannes Hörner. Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons. Econometrica, 2009, Vol.77,n°1, pp.29-69. ⟨hal-00464577⟩

Collections

HEC CNRS
47 View
0 Download

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More