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Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons

Abstract : We study the role of observability in bargaining with correlated values. Short-run buyers sequentially submit offers to one seller. When previous offers are observable, bargaining is likely to end up in an impasse. In contrast, when offers are hidden, agreement is always reached, although with delay.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, March 17, 2010 - 2:56:23 PM
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  • HAL Id : hal-00464577, version 1



Nicolas Vieille, Johannes Hörner. Public vs. Private Offers in the Market for Lemons. Econometrica, Econometric Society, 2009, Vol.77,n°1, pp.29-69. ⟨hal-00464577⟩



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