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Journal Articles Games and Economic Behavior / Games and Economic Behaviour Year : 2009

Informational externalities and emergence of consensus

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Abstract

We study a general model of dynamic games with purely informational externalities. We prove that eventually all motives for experimentation disappear, and provide the exact rate at which experimentation decays. We also provide tight conditions under which players eventually reach a consensus. These results imply extensions of many known results in the literature of social learning and getting to agreement.

Dates and versions

hal-00464565 , version 1 (17-03-2010)

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Nicolas Vieille, Eilon Solan, Dinah Rosenberg. Informational externalities and emergence of consensus. Games and Economic Behavior / Games and Economic Behaviour, 2009, Vol.66,n°2, pp.979-994. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.027⟩. ⟨hal-00464565⟩
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