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Informational externalities and emergence of consensus

Abstract : We study a general model of dynamic games with purely informational externalities. We prove that eventually all motives for experimentation disappear, and provide the exact rate at which experimentation decays. We also provide tight conditions under which players eventually reach a consensus. These results imply extensions of many known results in the literature of social learning and getting to agreement.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, March 17, 2010 - 2:35:53 PM
Last modification on : Tuesday, May 5, 2020 - 1:03:20 PM

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Nicolas Vieille, Eilon Solan, Dinah Rosenberg. Informational externalities and emergence of consensus. Games and Economic Behavior / Games and Economic Behaviour, 2009, Vol.66,n°2, pp.979-994. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.027⟩. ⟨hal-00464565⟩

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