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Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring

Abstract : This paper introduces an equilibrium concept called perfect communication equilibrium for repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. This concept is a refinement of Myerson's [Myerson, R.B., 1982. Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal agent problems, J. Math. Econ. 10, 67–81] communication equilibrium. A communication equilibrium is perfect if it induces a communication equilibrium of the continuation game, after every history of messages of the mediator. We provide a characterization of the set of corresponding equilibrium payoffs and derive a Folk Theorem for discounted repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.
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Submitted on : Wednesday, March 17, 2010 - 2:02:17 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM

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Tristan Tomala. Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Games and Economic Behavior / Games and Economic Behaviour, 2009, Vol.67,n°2, pp.682-694. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2009.02.005⟩. ⟨hal-00464537⟩

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