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Journal Articles Economics Letters Year : 2008

Moral hazard contracts: Does one size fit all?

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Alexander K. Koch
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Abstract

We show that firms' practice of anonymous contracts (“one-size-fits-all”) can be reconciled with standard agency theory if careers are marked by frequent transitions between employers, and agents have career concerns because complete long-term contracts are not feasible.

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hal-00463445 , version 1 (12-03-2010)

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Alexander K. Koch, Eloïc Peyrache. Moral hazard contracts: Does one size fit all?. Economics Letters, 2008, Vol.100,n°3, pp.399-401. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2008.03.003⟩. ⟨hal-00463445⟩

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