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Moral hazard contracts: Does one size fit all?

Alexander K. Koch Eloïc Peyrache 1
1 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC
Abstract : We show that firms' practice of anonymous contracts (“one-size-fits-all”) can be reconciled with standard agency theory if careers are marked by frequent transitions between employers, and agents have career concerns because complete long-term contracts are not feasible.
Keywords : Anonymous contracts Career concerns Incentive contracts Reputation
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Journal articles
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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00463445
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Friday, March 12, 2010 - 11:43:50 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM

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Alexander K. Koch, Eloïc Peyrache. Moral hazard contracts: Does one size fit all?. Economics Letters, Elsevier, 2008, Vol.100,n°3, pp.399-401. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2008.03.003⟩. ⟨hal-00463445⟩

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