Moral hazard contracts: Does one size fit all?

Alexander K. Koch , Eloïc Peyrache (1)

1 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC

We show that firms' practice of anonymous contracts (“one-size-fits-all”) can be reconciled with standard agency theory if careers are marked by frequent transitions between employers, and agents have career concerns because complete long-term contracts are not feasible.

Keywords: Anonymous contracts; Career concerns; Incentive contracts; Reputation

Domains: Humanities and Social Sciences; Economics and Finance; Economy and decision science

Alexander K. Koch, Eloïc Peyrache. Moral hazard contracts: Does one size fit all?. Economics Letters, 2008, Vol.100,n°3, pp.399-401. ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2008.03.003⟩. ⟨hal-00463445⟩