Two-sided matching with interdependent values - HEC Paris - École des hautes études commerciales de Paris Access content directly
Journal Articles Journal of Economic Theory Year : 2010

Two-sided matching with interdependent values

Archishman Chakraborty
  • Function : Author
Michael Ostrovsky
  • Function : Author


We introduce and study two-sided matching with incomplete information and interdependent valuations on one side of the market. An example of such a setting is a matching market between colleges and students in which colleges receive partially informative signals about students. Stability in such markets depends on the amount of information about matchings available to colleges. When colleges observe the entire matching, a stable matching mechanism does not generally exist. When colleges observe only their own matches, a stable mechanism exists if students have identical preferences over colleges, but may not exist if students have different preferences.

Dates and versions

hal-00463247 , version 1 (11-03-2010)



Alessandro Citanna, Archishman Chakraborty, Michael Ostrovsky. Two-sided matching with interdependent values. Journal of Economic Theory, 2010, 145 (1), pp.85-105. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.004⟩. ⟨hal-00463247⟩


472 View
0 Download



Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More