Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

Two-sided matching with interdependent values

Abstract : We introduce and study two-sided matching with incomplete information and interdependent valuations on one side of the market. An example of such a setting is a matching market between colleges and students in which colleges receive partially informative signals about students. Stability in such markets depends on the amount of information about matchings available to colleges. When colleges observe the entire matching, a stable matching mechanism does not generally exist. When colleges observe only their own matches, a stable mechanism exists if students have identical preferences over colleges, but may not exist if students have different preferences.
Complete list of metadata
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, March 11, 2010 - 4:33:47 PM
Last modification on : Saturday, June 25, 2022 - 10:50:37 AM





Alessandro Citanna, Archishman Chakraborty, Michael Ostrovsky. Two-sided matching with interdependent values. Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, 2010, 145 (1), pp.85-105. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.004⟩. ⟨hal-00463247⟩



Record views