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Journal articles
A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies
Abstract : In an example where some bidders have superadditive values, we characterize the equilibria of a simultaneous ascending auction and compare the revenue and efficiency generated with ones generated by the sequential, the one-shot simultaneous, and the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auctions.
https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00460031
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Friday, February 26, 2010 - 9:44:17 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Friday, February 26, 2010 - 9:44:17 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM
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