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Journal Articles Economics Letters Year : 2001

A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies

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Fabrizio Germano
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Gian Luigi Albano
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Abstract

In an example where some bidders have superadditive values, we characterize the equilibria of a simultaneous ascending auction and compare the revenue and efficiency generated with ones generated by the sequential, the one-shot simultaneous, and the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auctions.

Dates and versions

hal-00460031 , version 1 (26-02-2010)

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Stefano Lovo, Fabrizio Germano, Gian Luigi Albano. A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies. Economics Letters, 2001, Vol.71,n°1, pp.55-60. ⟨10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00394-3⟩. ⟨hal-00460031⟩

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