Skip to Main content Skip to Navigation
Journal articles

A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies

Abstract : In an example where some bidders have superadditive values, we characterize the equilibria of a simultaneous ascending auction and compare the revenue and efficiency generated with ones generated by the sequential, the one-shot simultaneous, and the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auctions.
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadata
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Friday, February 26, 2010 - 9:44:17 AM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM

Links full text




Stefano Lovo, Fabrizio Germano, Gian Luigi Albano. A comparison of standard multi-unit auctions with synergies. Economics Letters, Elsevier, 2001, Vol.71,n°1, pp.55-60. ⟨10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00394-3⟩. ⟨hal-00460031⟩



Record views