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Journal articles
Retaliatory Equilibria in a Japanese Ascending Auction for Multiple Objects.
Abstract : We construct a family of retaliatory equilibria for the Japanese ascending auction for multiple objects and show that, while it is immune to many of the tacitly collusive equilibria studied in the literature, it is not entirely immune when some bidders are commonly known to be interested in a specific object.
https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00459967
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Thursday, February 25, 2010 - 4:51:09 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Thursday, February 25, 2010 - 4:51:09 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM
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