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Journal Articles Review of Economic Design Year : 2006

Retaliatory Equilibria in a Japanese Ascending Auction for Multiple Objects.

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Fabrizio Germano
  • Function : Author
Gian Luigi Albano
  • Function : Author

Abstract

We construct a family of retaliatory equilibria for the Japanese ascending auction for multiple objects and show that, while it is immune to many of the tacitly collusive equilibria studied in the literature, it is not entirely immune when some bidders are commonly known to be interested in a specific object.

Dates and versions

hal-00459967 , version 1 (25-02-2010)

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Stefano Lovo, Fabrizio Germano, Gian Luigi Albano. Retaliatory Equilibria in a Japanese Ascending Auction for Multiple Objects.. Review of Economic Design, 2006, Vol.10,n°1, pp.1-8. ⟨10.1007/s10058-006-0006-z⟩. ⟨hal-00459967⟩

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