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Retaliatory Equilibria in a Japanese Ascending Auction for Multiple Objects.

Stefano Lovo 1 Fabrizio Germano Gian Luigi Albano
1 GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC
Abstract : We construct a family of retaliatory equilibria for the Japanese ascending auction for multiple objects and show that, while it is immune to many of the tacitly collusive equilibria studied in the literature, it is not entirely immune when some bidders are commonly known to be interested in a specific object.
Keywords : Ascending auctions for multiple objects Clock auctions FCC auctions Retaliation
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Journal articles
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https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00459967
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Thursday, February 25, 2010 - 4:51:09 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM

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Stefano Lovo, Fabrizio Germano, Gian Luigi Albano. Retaliatory Equilibria in a Japanese Ascending Auction for Multiple Objects.. Review of Economic Design, Springer Verlag, 2006, Vol.10,n°1, pp.1-8. ⟨10.1007/s10058-006-0006-z⟩. ⟨hal-00459967⟩

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