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Retaliatory Equilibria in a Japanese Ascending Auction for Multiple Objects.

Abstract : We construct a family of retaliatory equilibria for the Japanese ascending auction for multiple objects and show that, while it is immune to many of the tacitly collusive equilibria studied in the literature, it is not entirely immune when some bidders are commonly known to be interested in a specific object.
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Submitted on : Thursday, February 25, 2010 - 4:51:09 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM

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Stefano Lovo, Fabrizio Germano, Gian Luigi Albano. Retaliatory Equilibria in a Japanese Ascending Auction for Multiple Objects.. Review of Economic Design, Springer Verlag, 2006, Vol.10,n°1, pp.1-8. ⟨10.1007/s10058-006-0006-z⟩. ⟨hal-00459967⟩

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