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Journal articles
Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information
Abstract : We define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best replies after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff. The characterization is applied to the analysis of reputations.
https://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00459955
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Thursday, February 25, 2010 - 4:10:13 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM
Contributor : Antoine Haldemann <>
Submitted on : Thursday, February 25, 2010 - 4:10:13 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM