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Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information

Abstract : We define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best replies after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff. The characterization is applied to the analysis of reputations.
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Contributor : Antoine Haldemann Connect in order to contact the contributor
Submitted on : Thursday, February 25, 2010 - 4:10:13 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, January 11, 2018 - 6:19:31 AM


  • HAL Id : hal-00459955, version 1



Stefano Lovo, Johannes Hörner, Tristan Tomala. Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information. Econometrica, Econometric Society, 2009, Vol.77,n°2, pp.453-487. ⟨hal-00459955⟩



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