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Journal Articles Econometrica Year : 2009

Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information

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Abstract

We define belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as sequential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best replies after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature. We characterize a set of payoffs that includes all belief-free equilibrium payoffs. Conversely, any payoff in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff. The characterization is applied to the analysis of reputations.
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Dates and versions

hal-00459955 , version 1 (25-02-2010)

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  • HAL Id : hal-00459955 , version 1

Cite

Stefano Lovo, Johannes Hörner, Tristan Tomala. Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information. Econometrica, 2009, Vol.77,n°2, pp.453-487. ⟨hal-00459955⟩

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