 |
 |
 |
|
|
|
| HAL : hal-00481313, version 1 |
| DOI : 10.1007/s102030200002 |
| Fiche détaillée |  Récupérer au format |
|
|
| Decisions in Economics and Finance Vol.25, n°1 (2002) pp.33-45 |
|
|
|
|
| Bargaining over an uncertain outcome: the role of beliefs |
|
|
| Antoine Billot 1Alain Chateauneuf 2 |
|
|
| (01/05/2002) |
|
|
|
| We study the Nash bargaining solution of a problem in which two agents bargain over an uncertain outcome. Under the assumptions of risk neutrality and of constant absolute risk aversion, we study the way that the solution varies, ex ante, when we vary the beliefs of one agent. Changing an agent's beliefs in a way that makes them "more distant" from the other agent's beliefs makes the second agent better off. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1 : | Laboratoire d'Économie Moderne (LEM) |
|
|
|
Université Paris II - Panthéon-Assas : EA4442 |
|
|
| 2 : | CEntre de Recherche en Mathématiques, Statistique et Économie Mathématique (CERMSEM) |
|
|
|
CNRS : UMR8095 – Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne |
|
|
| 3 : | Tel Aviv University |
|
|
|
Tel Aviv University |
|
|
| 4 : | Equipe Universitaire de Recherche en Economie Quantitative (EUREQUA) |
|
|
|
CNRS : UMR8594 – Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Domaine | : | Sciences de l'Homme et Société/Economies et finances/Economie et sciences de la décision |
|
|
| risk – games – outcome |
|
| hal-00481313, version 1 | |
| http://hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00481313 | |
| oai:hal-hec.archives-ouvertes.fr:hal-00481313 | |
| Contributeur : Sophie Forcadell | |
| Soumis le : Jeudi 6 Mai 2010, 13:48:55 | |
| Dernière modification le : Mercredi 12 Décembre 2012, 13:53:11 | |
